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A new and disturbing question is posed these days, both in Europe 
and the United States. Has the traditional American support for 
the cause of European unity become a thing of the past? Is 
Washington shifting toward hostility to the European Community? 
It is important to bring this question out in the open. The answer 
can be quite categorical: There has not been nor will there be a 
shift in policy. The American Administration continues its firm 
support of European unity, including the enlargement of the Com-
munity. 
But it is not enough to leave the matter with merely a query and 
response. The fact that the question can be seriously considered 
indicates that the general situation has changed. In order that 
we understand the present and thus deal intelligently with the 
future, it is necessary to note the principal elements of change. 
The 1950's were aperiod of dominant American economic strength; 
the 1970's have brought severe internal and external economic 
problems to the United States. The 1950's were a period of almost 
open-ended American commitments to assure security, to sponsor and 
join in efforts to develop the less fortunate areas of the world; 
the 1970's have ushered in a time of questioning, of painstaking 
assessment of U.S. interests, of determining American actions on 
the basis of what others are prepared to do for themselves. From 
a willingness to assume without question the major responsibility 
for the Free World's security the country has become increasingly 
restless in the face of inequity in the division of the burden 
for common defense. 
There is a new quality of criticism that focuses on both Japan 
and Europe. The internationalism of the postwar period has been 
replaced by a new atmosphere of nationalism; and, as President 
Nixon warned during the recent International Bank and Fund meeting 
in Washington, " ... there is a growing and disturbing isolationism 
developing in our country ... 11 It is at the heart of his foreign 
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It would be reckless to ignore these elements of change and the 
deterioration in the general American attitude toward international 
matters. To do so would deny us the opportunity to arrest this 
drift and to find means of restoring the mutual confidence and 
common action that are vital to the interests of Europe and the 
United States alike. 
Certainly a substantial part of the present American unease and 
questioning derives from the period of change we are entering. In 
addition to the far-ranging and difficult internal American prcb-
lems, there is the complicated relationship between the USSR and 
the People's Republic of China, the new situation developing 
between the Western nations and the countries of Eastern Europe 
and Russia, and the continuing ferment in the poor nations south 
of the equator. The current monetary crisis forecasts significant 
modifications in the world trade and payments system. One of the 
most dramatic new elements and one of the greatest potential 
importance is the enlargement of the European Community. It is 
against this background of change and movement that the new 
questioning takes place. 
II 
What one can extract from the present situation Vietn~m, a 
balance of payments crisis, domestic economic difficulties and 
insistent internal demands is that in its own way America has 
been groping for a partner with whom problems and difficulties can 
be shared. The calendar and the present stage of the European 
construction have conspired to deny us the associate we seek, It 
might be argued that given a few more years, with the new members 
absorbed within the Community, with the pace of European economic 
activity resumed, a more coherent, organized and self-confident 
Europe would then be able to play the role America perhaps searches 
for but poorly articulates. 
At the moment not even the European participants are willing to 
predict the nature of the Community that will emerge or to indicate, 
for instance, what its likely development will be in the fields of 
foreign policy and defense. The absence of a European consensus at 
a moment of crisis is bound to leave the United States confused and 
uneasy. If there is bafflement about future directions, not a few 
Americans are ready to raise questions about the Europe they think 
they see now. 
Americans have not been hesitant to criticize the preferential 
arrangements with the African states or with the nations bordering 
on the Mediterranean. American concern has sharpened about the 
association arrangements in prospect with the European neutrals. 
Certainly this should be no surprise, as American reservation about 
such arrangements was forcefully advanced in 1957 and 1958, and 
again in 1961 and 1962, during the first British negotiations. 
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I am not persuaded that Europeans entirely appreciate the reasons 
for the American apprehension about these developments. Surely 
worry about the adverse effects on American exports can be under-
stood, even though in many cases this damage in the nature of things 
is a future potential rather than a present reality. But more 
fundamentally the American reaction arises out of conviction that 
what is at stake is the future of the entire world trading system. 
This system, to which we have all contributed and from which we all 
benefit, has been based on the most favored nation principle, on 
the antithesis of regional arrangements. 
This battle of principle has a long and distinguished history. In 
1932 that great and tragic statesman, Bruning, had approached 
Benes in Geneva to propose that each country cut its tariffs by 
15 percent in the first year, another 10 percent in the second. The 
objective was to draw in the other Danubian nations and by so 
doing to attract to the agreement all of the European states. 
Bruning's purpose was to bring a halt to the process, which was 
shortly to produce the Ottawa Agreements, toward isolated and 
quite possibly antagonistic regional groupings. He feared that 
this drift would be totally destructive to world economic recovery. 
After World War II and within the same policy conception the 
United States attacked the Commonwealth preferences in the course 
of the British Loan negotiations. 
Whatever may be the merit of the political and economic rationale 
for the arrangements that the European Community has negotiated, 
no serious effort seems to have been made to reconcile these 
arrangements with an open, non-discriminatory international 
system. More specifically, there has been little attention given 
to the inevitable effect of this slowly spreading regional system 
on American foreign economic policy and on the degree to which 
these preferential arrangements have strengthened the hands of 
the protectionists in the United States. 
The foregoing has been one of the developments that have led to a 
new doubt in the United States as to whether an enlarged Community 
will be open, responsible and ready to exercise leadership in 
bringing about a more effective, liberal and equitable international 
economic system. Allied with this doubt there is the risk that 
the Community may be so absorbed with its own internal development 
and special arrangements with its immediate neighbors that the 
principal characteristic of the Community will be its inward 
orientation. 
There is a further fearo It is argued that Europe will only unify 
if it has something to organize against. There are thoughtful 
Americans who worry that it may turn out that the new "enemy 
outside" is to be the United States. Unfortunately in the present 
tense and uncertain atmosphere it is possible to give substance 
to such fears through quite innocent European developments. For 
instance, the European desire to create conditions which will 
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encourage indigenous companies of size and weight equal to the 
American giants can be seen either as a wholesome competition or 
as a hidden threat to American companies. In an atmosphere of 
mutual confidence and cooperation apprehensions are submerged. But 
in time of friction, recrimination and uncertainty there is a 
tendency to put the worst face on coincidental developments. 
III 
The foregoing is more than anything an attempt to project the 
psychology of the situation. To some extent in this difficult 
transitional period, the mood fear, vigorous myths, misunder-
standing may be of substantially greater importance than the 
actual facts of our relations. But over the near term the future 
course of European-American relations, indeed quite possibly of 
the world order itself, may depend heavily on the response of the 
European Community to a number of fundamental questions. Indeed, 
it seems likely that the very nature of American foreign policy 
will be shaped in substantial part by what others and 
especially Europe do. 
It is in this context that the present financial crisis should be 
considered. It is a complex and basic issue of the greatest 
importance both to the Community and to the United States. The 
Americans have insisted that the inter-conncection among finance, 
trade and burden sharing cannot be ignored. In reality this 
insistence is merely a recognition of a fact of life. And by 
pressing this inter-connection America is also pointing up the 
dangers to all of us implicit in attempts to analyze and conclude 
matters in separate, seemingly isolated compartments. 
It is unfortunately true that the present Community is poorly 
prepared to meet this challenge, to approach the problem in the 
way it is presented by America. Furthermore the current financial 
crisis carries with it an urgency and the necessity for quick 
resolution. The Community is not an institution that finds it 
easy to sort out issues within a tight time frame. 
IV 
The previous discussion has been designed to lay the basis for 
a consideration of certain fundamental institutional problems; 
not to analyze in any detail the substantive problems themselves. 
It is sufficient for this paper to establish that we are all 
condemned to live in a highly complex, rapidly changing world, 
one of greater rather than less interdependence, in which 
problems show far greater strength and resiliency than our capacity 
to deal with them. It is a timely moment to consider the 
institutional quandary of our life and of our common relations. 
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Fortunately it is possible to approach this question without in 
any sense seeming to lecture Europe on its problems. In point 
of fact it is hard not to be surprised by the degree to which we 
face similar if not identical political and institutional problems, 
both internally and externally. 
In this connection it is ins~ructive to note the steps that 
President Nixon has taken to deal with two crucial problems; 
First, the need for continual executive control to get the 
priorities right and, second, to organize the government in such 
a fashion that the major departments include relevant sectors of 
activities rather than a conglomeration of absent-mindedly inherited 
tasks. For the first task, the President has established a series 
of key positions within the White House those filled by 
Kissinger, Erlichman and Peterson. These are in are in addition 
to the Council of Economic Advisers and the Director of Budget 
and Management, Executive Office organizations designed to aid 
the President in the effective exercise of his authority. 
One of the major difficulties in carrying through the broad 
reorganization designed to deal with the various departments and 
agencies is the fact that the mere suggestion throws into sharp 
relief the organizational anachronisms of the Congress itself. 
Disinterested observers suggest that the chances of success 
for the President's proposals are dependent on parallel action 
in the legislative branch of the government. The significant 
point, however, is the President's identification of a major 
governmental problem and his imaginative approach to it. 
It seems evident that Europe must cope with the same two 
problems to organize to get priorities right and to insure 
a sensible grouping of governmental activities. Beyond this, 
and due to the nature and stage of Community development, 
Europe has some unique problems. 
In the first place there has been no "constitutional" decision 
by the Member States on the functions that might best be 
handled at the Communjty level. Even where decisions on 
Community functions have been made, under the Treaties of 
Rome anc of Paris, there is only a limited consensus on the 
mandate of the European Communities as such; still less with 
respect to the executive role of the Commission. This absence 
of consensus brings with it the dangers of jerry-built solutions, 
of ad hoe arrangements; for instance, of special groups under 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives, of the Political 
Directors of the Six as an independent body. 
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We have a wealth of similar and not very happy experience in 
America. The United States struggles with a vast conglomeration 
of independent commissions or agencies, bodies that are neither 
executive nor legislative, where the rationale for many has 
vanished in the mists of time. One of the major defects of the 
nation's welfare program is its mad pattern of conflicting and 
overlapping authorizations, of federal, state and local 
activities established at various times under varying circumstances 
without apparent thought to a consistent anJ comprehensive scheme. 
This is more than a baffling challenge to the political scientist. 
The confusion, impotence and disorder contribute to the growing 
and general public disenchantment with government as such. A 
better educated, informed and involved public is not content 
with a government that finds itself unable to develop programs 
to deal with problems once a national consensus has been 
reached or to carry out agreed policies. 
V 
Insofar as relations across the Atlantic are concerned we are 
face to face with similar problems. A recurrent and insistent 
American refrain is, "How can one do business with the Community?" 
When a specific oroblem arises and it is brought to European 
attention we frequently find sympathy and understanding among 
the Commissioners, or among the Member States but this is just 
as frequently accompanied by a kind of frustrated helplessness. 
We are first warned and then discover that this goodwill cannot 
be translated into effective Community action. Responsibility 
has been so diffused and the ability to veto action so widely 
held that the net result of many proposed solutions is inaction 
or at best only partial answers, too late. 
Once again the Community and the United States resemble one 
another. Europeans justly observe that on such matters as 
American Selling Price, where agreements have been reached 
with the Executjve Branch, the obduracy of the Congress 
effectively prevents action. This has led such experienced 
diplomat-negotiators as Jean-Francois Deniau to say (Le Mende 
October 19-20, 1971) that any international negotiation with 
respect to non-tariff barriers must be preceded by a firm grant 
of authority from the Congress to the American negotiators. 
An appreciation of this broad range of problems was presumably 
one of the principal reasons that the Heads of Government 
meeting was called in December, 1969, This European Summit 
meeting demonstrated that a device exists to set priorities, 
to connect related issues and to make what amounts to constitu-
tional decisions. The Summit meeting is a means of determining 
the degree of "political will" and of exercising this "will." 
It is a means of laying down deadlines for execution. Even the 
setting of a date for a summit produces a dynamic effect within 
the several administrations. As such meetings must succeed, 
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the bureaucracies almost despite themselves become committed 
to success. What this device cannot do, however, is either 
to be the means to or even the assurance of execution. In 
short, a Heads of Government meeting does nothing automatically 
to insure the executive means of carrying out agreed tasks. 
Thus, and quite apart from the urgent intra-European issues 
that lect to the proposed 1972 Summit Meeting of the Ten, there 
are press:lng problems of priority and organization that seemingly 
will only yield in the face of Heads of Government attention. 
VI 
This leads naturally to the broad problem of American-Community 
relations. There is general agreement on one point: The 
present arrangements are less than satisfactory. Both the 
Chancellor and the leader of the opposition have spoken force-
fully on the issue. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel on November 5 
said: "It is indispensable that the dialogue between the 
United States and the Community be improved. To this end there 
is an urgent need to institutionalize this dialogue. The pressure 
of time is great. A first requirement to accomplish this, 
however, is that the Europeans devise the necessary instrumen-
tality, an instrumentality for a stronger political cooperation 
with a Europe of Ten." 
I believe that both sides of the Atlantic would agree that we 
now have to a disagreeable extent the mutual capacity to surprise 
one another and in rather unpleasant ways, a propensity to take 
actions without full attention to the adverse political and 
economic affects on the other of these actions, and only 
limited appreciation of why certain actions must be taken. To 
say this is to underscore that the present lines of communi-
cation are insufficient. 
As with most human affairs, it is easier to set forth the 
complaint and the problem than it is to devise solutions. 
For instance, for several years we have been experimenting 
with a system of informal consultation between the European 
Commission and the American Executive branch, an arrangement 
which involves semi-annual meetings. In the absence of a 
formal mandate to the Commission by the Council of Ministers, 
this form of consultation can only rarely lead to decisions 
and solutions. Indeed both sides have been depressed by the 
failure to find remedies to the many small irritants that 
trouble relations between the Community and the United States. 
Further, the limited authority of the Commission precludes 
systematic consideration of those issues which are central 
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to the general crisis in our relations defense, burden sharing, 
modification of the trade and payments system and the broad 
problems of Western foreign relations. Further, there are many 
urgent areas where the United States is anxious to work with the 
Community and where a Community role would seem almost inevitable, 
but where the Commission has no authority. Cases in point are 
environmental policy and the whole range of interrelated energy 
issues. 
Confronted by a somewhat symmetrical set of institutional problems 
it would seem that both the American Government and the Community 
must search for ways of fielding delegations authorized to deal 
with the broadest range of issues without being restricted to 
artificially imposed and confined segments. 
This poses some exceedingly difficult problems for the Community. 
If the Commission is to handle such discussions and negotiations, 
which Commissioners and on the basis of what instructions and 
mandate? The Europeans would be the first to protest that if 
a mandate must be sought then it will inevitably be narrow and, 
due to the porous nature of the "open Community," known in all 
its details by the Americans in advance of the meetings. And 
we have all learned that the mandate system is not a method that 
furthers serious consultations, indeed it can be an obstacle to 
the serious negotiation. 
An alternative would be to in~lude in Community teams either 
representatives of the Member States, along the lines of the 
Rome Treaty Article 111 Committee in trade negotiations, or 
perhaps actual members drawn from the Council of Ministers. 
A further alternative has been to suggest that the Council 
or the Summit itself designate one or several of its members 
to negotiate with the United States. For certain ~~tters and 
on certain occasions some such arrangement might well have 
value. But given the fundamental, continuing nature of 
relations across the Atlantic there would appear to be an 
episodic quality to this device. It would risk only touching 
the surface of the real and difficult problems, to say nothing 
of the question of whether it could be the means of handling 
those matters which require continuity in working attention. 
There is a distinction here that is important. Both within 
the United States and the European Community, and between the 
Community and the United States, there are interrelated policy 
issues and decisions that can only be made at a high political 
level. This is the level of decision-making. Execution and 
the management of issues within the policy framework are the 
responsibility of other people, at other times and in other 
frameworkso 
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Another device would be some sort_9f_joint secretariat which 
would assume a continuing responsibility for EC-US relations. 
I find it hard to see how any such body would do much other 
than further complicate already complex relations. A secretariat 
by definition does not have responsibility and it is responsibility 
we principally seek 1 
VII 
To make any progress at all with these stubborn and basic 
issues we should examine once·again what we presumably wish 
to accomplish under the heading of "improved relations between 
the Community and the United States." 
At the outset one thing is clear. Neither side wishes to 
interfere with those normal and continuing relations that now 
exist between the individual Member States and American autho-
rities, any more than we wish to come between the highly 
useful arrangements of the Group of Ten, the OECD or NATO. 
But to say this is not to argue that because these arrangements 
exist they in turn make unnecessary new contacts and conceptions 
between an enlarged Community and the United States. 
The first task, perhaps the easiest, would be a commitment to 
the exploration and discussion of major issues. In short, 
there must be an improved dialogue. If this is accomplished 
then the possibility of unpleasant surprises can be minimized. 
The closer and better this process the more each side will be 
induced to take into consideration the effects of its proposed 
actions on the other. Further, if the compelling reasons for 
action are understood in advance, the other side will be more 
willing to recognize, and even perhaps to accept, the inevita-
bility of disagreeable side effects. 
The second task, in some ways a part of the first, is to insure 
tnat there is a serious and responsible dialogue on the broad 
interconnected issues of defense, burden sharing, finance and 
trade. It will challenge the Europeans to decide in the 
present circumstances how to deal organizationally with this 
issue. It is not an easy task for the United States. 
The third issue and one on which we have had some small success 
is the continuing problem of dealing with specific trade or 
other disputes and issues. To succeed in this area, and succeed 
we must, will require strong political will on each side. We 
must proceed more in the spirit of parallel action than of close 
bargaining or negotiation. In some if not many cases problems 
will have to be set aside for the time being while we await 
more propitious circumstances for action. Finally, some high 
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level body must exist which will oversee the process, and insist 
on minimum performance within agreed time schedules. Given the 
difficulty of the problems and the labyrinthian political system, 
the absence of some such mechanism means, in effect, no action. 
For instance, the financial crisis hit suddenly last summer. 
The Americans have insisted that there be a trade component 
in the settlement. Under present circumstances it is exceedingly 
difficult for the Community to attack effectively and speedily 
this aspect of the more general problems. 
The fourth task will be to find the means of carrying on 
continuing joint examination and even joint work on matters 
of common concern. These are matters where it is the common 
interest, not the conflict of interest, which dominates. In 
the field of environment, isolating the problem, selecting among 
alternative policies, and taking action would be a case in point. 
Another example is the energy crisis: with demand running well 
beyond prospective fossil fuel supplies, the question of alter~ 
native energy sources; the conflict between environmental policies 
and energy policies. There is also the growing, only partially 
formulated, concern about the role and place of the multinational 
corporation. This is not the context within which to examine 
this important subject. Suffice it to note that with a general 
shift in parities European and especially German investment in 
companies in the United States becomes much more attractive. 
This will add another facetto the broad issue of the inter-
national company. It is vital that the imaginative phenomenon 
of the multinational company be examined as a common issue of 
public policy before it becomes a matter of the Community against 
American firms, or of the United States against foreign firms. 
To dO this will invest consultation with its widest meaning. 
VIII 
We face a period of major change, of transition, even of danger. 
The international structure which has held fast for the last 
25 years, with its broad distribution of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, is shifting rapidly. What-
ever one thought of the past, it was at least known. A pervasive 
unease arises from the uncertainty of the future and the difficulty 
of finding those new points to which to anchor. While it is 
always risky to prophesy a time or period where fateful decisions 
promise to shape the future, it would seem that the next six months 
will be such a moment in history. The decisions that are-made --
or aredeferred and the patterns established may set the nature 
and, direction of our world. 
Despite all the uncertainties of the American scene there is 
nothing foreordained as to the broad d~rection or orientation 
of American foreign policy. While there is a degree of irritation 
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with Europe, suspicion as to what the future holds, some reser-
vation about an enlarged European Community, there is, more 
importantly, a continuing deep interest in and sympathy for 
this great endeavor. In my view it will take only a limited 
European effort to turn apprehension into a lively interest in 
a new form of more equal partnership. At the moment America is 
torn between a desire to lay down grandiose international tasks 
and a recognition that it must not and cannot forego a large 
degree of international responsibility. In this struggle a new 
Europe playing its role, evidencing its wish to work with the 
United States, can be the crucial element in the way this 
American dilemna is resolved. It would seem that European 
and American ministers have an historic responsibility to 
recognize the urgency of this situation and to devise new 
arrangements to insure that the two sides of the Atlantic 
work together rather than at increasingly angry and destructive 
cross purposes. 
* * * * * * * 

